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Peru’s presidency carousel
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No Peruvian president has completed a full term since 2016. The last to do so was Ollanta Humala, who later received a 15-year prison sentence for aggravated money laundering. What followed was a decade of seven failed presidencies, defined by ineffective leadership, corruption, bribery, impeachments, resignations, and a coup attempt.
34 presidential candidates
That same instability now dominates the electoral field. Peru’s upcoming general election on April 12, 2026 features a record number of presidential candidates, with thirty-four officially registered, up from eighteen in the 2021 election.
The candidates represent the full breadth of the political spectrum, from far left, left, centre, right, and far right, including populists and traditionalists, as well as establishment figures and high-profile outsiders such as a comedian and a former footballer who is also an ex-mayor.
Left-wing contenders include figures linked to Peru Libre and Marxist platforms. Vladimir Cerrón remains a leading hard-left figure, though legal troubles limit his candidacy, and Ronald Atencio is emerging as a notable alternative.
Centrist candidates span moderate reformists and established political figures. Mario Vizcarra, brother of former president Martín Vizcarra, is positioning a moderate reformist ticket. Figures such as Yonhy Lescano and César Acuña also occupy centrist lanes, as does former mayor and ex-footballer George Forsyth.
On the right, the field is broad but lacks a dominant nominee. Rafael López Aliaga, a conservative former mayor of Lima, has gained meaningful support with tough stances on crime and pro-business rhetoric. Keiko Fujimori, with high name recognition from three prior presidential runs, remains a key figure but is also polarising, which dampens her ceiling. Other right-leaning figures include the journalist and television presenter Philip Butters, as well as conservative military or security-focused candidates such as Roberto Chiabra, alongside media personalities like Carlos Álvarez who run as outsiders.
Across polls, however, all candidates face an electorate marked by unusually high levels of indecision. In multiple surveys, undecided voters constituted a plurality. Polling through late 2025 and early 2026 also indicates wide dispersion of voter intentions. Rafael López Aliaga and Vizcarra have led various polls with moderate single-digit support, while Fujimori’s standing fluctuates below her previous electoral performances.
Security over corruption
While corruption remains endemic, exemplified by convictions of former officials and ongoing allegations across administrations, it no longer dominates public discourse to the same extent as security and economic concerns in the current cycle. Analysts see a shift in prioritisation towards order and public safety, particularly in urban and peri-urban areas where crime rates have surged, including violence linked to illegal mining and gang activities. In some regions, criminal clashes have driven community unrest and highlighted enforcement gaps.
External influences on the election are expected to be muted compared with other regional contests. Left-wing governments in the hemisphere show limited direct intervention, while parties aligned with pro-market platforms may receive attention or tacit engagement from US and international stakeholders, mainly around investment and security co-operation.
A new Senate
To address Peru’s political fragmentation and strengthen checks and balances, a major proposed institutional change is the transition from Peru’s longstanding unicameral legislature to a bicameral system that would introduce a Senate alongside the existing Chamber of Deputies.
The new Senate would consist of 60 members, half elected from territorial constituencies and half on a nationwide basis, requiring candidates to appeal both locally and nationally. While the Senate would not initiate legislation, it would hold decisive power in passing laws and settling impeachment outcomes following lower-house referral. This dual-chamber structure is also intended to balance powers currently concentrated in office holders and ministries.
Proponents argue that the reform could curb political dispersion by raising barriers to entry through electoral thresholds and regionally balanced representation, thereby reducing the proliferation of micro-parties. By requiring broader national support and reinforcing legislative scrutiny, the bicameral system is presented as a safeguard against weak coalition governments and informal patronage networks. Critics, however, warn that introducing a second chamber may produce gridlock between the houses, particularly if political alignment diverges.
Macroeconomic resilience with structural fragilities
Peru’s economic outlook is something of a mixed picture. On the one hand, it is hampered by long-standing structural weaknesses that successive administrations have struggled to address. The most persistent is informality. Roughly 70% of employment remains outside the formal economy, severely constraining tax collection, limiting productivity gains, and leaving large segments of the population without access to pensions, health insurance, or unemployment protection. This informal structure also weakens the transmission of public policy, making fiscal and social reforms harder to implement and sustain.
The pension system reflects these distortions. Coverage remains fragmented between public and private schemes, and contributions are low due to widespread informal employment. Repeated withdrawals from private pension funds in recent years have further eroded long-term savings, reducing the system’s capacity to provide adequate retirement income and weakening domestic capital markets. While reform proposals regularly surface, political volatility has repeatedly stalled meaningful implementation, leaving structural vulnerabilities largely intact.
Domestic constraints and political fragility persist, but Peru’s economic outcomes have been comparatively solid. Despite frequent changes in leadership, the country has preserved macroeconomic discipline for nearly two decades. Fiscal policy has remained conservative, and institutional continuity at the central bank has insulated monetary policy from short-term political pressures.
Peru’s public debt stands at around 32% of GDP, well below levels in major OECD economies. By comparison, US debt exceeds 120% of GDP, while Germany, often held up as a model of fiscal discipline, remains above 60%. After widening during the pandemic and peaking above 3.5% of GDP in 2024, Peru’s fiscal deficit has been narrowing and is expected to move closer to official targets in 2025 and 2026, with adjustment progressing more quickly than in many advanced economies where high deficits have become entrenched.
Inflation management is another area in which Peru compares favourably. Price pressures have largely remained within the central bank’s target range, supported by credible monetary policy and a stable currency framework. This contrasts with the prolonged inflationary episodes seen recently in both the United States and parts of Europe, where central banks have been forced into aggressive tightening cycles with uneven growth outcomes.
Growth prospects, while modest, are also comparatively stable. GDP expansion is forecast at around 3 to 3.5% through 2026, driven by mining investment, infrastructure projects, and steady export demand. This pace exceeds expected growth in Germany and is broadly comparable to, or slightly above, medium-term projections for the United States, even with Peru’s far greater political uncertainty. Strong commodity prices and a robust investment pipeline in mining continue to provide an external anchor for growth, while private investment remains sensitive to electoral outcomes.
Peru approaches the 2026 elections with a record-crowded presidential field and a fragmented party system that reflects deep institutional fatigue, alongside growing recognition that the status quo is unsustainable. Political volatility has weakened governance and public trust, pushing voters towards concerns over security, stability, and accountability. The proposed reintroduction of a Senate offers a potential path towards gradual correction by raising the bar for representation, reducing fragmentation, and strengthening legislative oversight. Persistent challenges such as informality and pension system weaknesses remain unresolved, but the country’s ability to preserve macroeconomic stability through repeated political crises suggests a stronger foundation than the political cycle alone would imply.
Summary Q&A
Why has Peru had so many presidents in recent years?
Peru has experienced persistent presidential turnover due to weak party structures, low congressional thresholds for impeachment, and chronic confrontation between the executive and Congress. Since 2018, no president has completed a full term, reflecting institutional fragility.
What is the proposed Senate reform and why does it matter?
Peru plans to shift from a unicameral legislature to a bicameral system by introducing a 60-seat Senate alongside the existing Chamber of Deputies. The Senate would hold final authority over legislation and impeachment outcomes. Supporters argue that it would reduce party fragmentation and strengthen checks and balances, while critics warn of potential legislative gridlock.
What are Peru’s main economic problems?
Peru’s most persistent economic challenge is informality, with roughly 70% of employment outside the formal economy. This limits tax revenue, weakens productivity growth, undermines pension coverage, and reduces the effectiveness of fiscal and social policy, leaving structural vulnerabilities largely unresolved.
Why is Peru’s macroeconomic position relatively strong?
Despite political instability, Peru has maintained conservative fiscal policy, low public debt of around 32% of GDP, and credible monetary policy anchored by an independent central bank. Inflation has largely remained within target ranges, and external demand for minerals continues to support growth.
What is Peru’s overall outlook ahead of the 2026 election?
Peru enters the 2026 election with deep political fragmentation and public fatigue but retains a stronger economic foundation than its leadership volatility suggests. Institutional reform, particularly the reintroduction of a Senate, offers a potential path towards gradual stabilisation, though execution risks and political resistance remain significant.
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